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From 27 March 2005 onwards, the independent humanitarian medical aid agency Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res,
together with the World Health Organization, the Angolan Ministry of Health, and others, responded to the
Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) outbreak in Uige, Angola, to contain the epidemic and care for those
infected. This response included community epidemiological surveillance, clinical assessment and isolation of
patients with MHF, safe burials and disinfection, home-based risk reduction, peripheral health facilitysupport,
psychosocial support, and information and education campaigns. Lessons were learned during the imple-
mentation of each outbreak control component, and the subsequent modiﬁcations of protocols and strategies
are discussed. Similar to what was seen in previous ﬁlovirus hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, the containment
of the MHF epidemic depended on the collaboration of the affected community. Actively involving all stak-
eholders from the start of the outbreak response is crucial.
Outbreak control in the community plays a crucial role
in ﬁlovirus hemorrhagic fever (FHF) containment.This
includes epidemiological surveillance (investigation of
alerts, contact tracing, and follow-up), clinical assess-
ment and isolation of patients with FHF (including
barrier nursing), safe burials and disinfection, and in-
formation and education campaigns (IECs), plus pe-
ripheral health facility support, psychosocial support,
and home-based risk reduction, where appropriate.
FHF outbreak control is rooted in a biomedical par-
adigm that applies principles of biological and other
natural sciences to the practice of clinicalmedicine.The
conventional approach to controllingFHFtransmission
focuses on biosafety, which uses biological knowledge,
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safety procedures, and specialized equipment to reduce
human exposure to the ﬁlovirus. Although this focus
is epidemiologically efﬁcacious, the outbreak control
procedures and paraphernalia terrify and alienate pa-
tients, families, and the community at large. Outbreak
control, however, depends on the collaboration of the
community. Because the treatment of FHF has limited
effectiveness, interrupting human-to-human transmis-
sion of the disease in the community is essential to
outbreak control. Principal routes of secondary trans-
mission include the care of patients with FHF by family
members and unsafe burial practices. In the absence of
community vigilance, the identiﬁcation of individuals
suspected to have FHF is a mission impossible for an
outbreak response team. When fear and anger lead a
community to refuse to collaborate, patients do not
present to an FHF ward for medical care and isolation,
which defeats a crucial component of outbreak control.
As events in Gabon and the Republic of the Congo
have demonstrated, community resistance can become
so severe and violent that international teams may be
prevented from completing their mission [1, 2]. Po-
tentially counterproductive effects of the conventionalMSF Intervention: Community • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S163
approach were recognized, and strategies to avoid alienation of
communities and to promote their involvement were devel-
oped. Since then, anthropologists have participated in FHF
outbreak responses and have formulated recommendations re-
garding how to make them more acceptable and effective with-
out compromising biosafety [2–5].
In this article, we highlight the learning process of the Span-
ish section of Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res (MSF) during the Mar-
burg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) outbreak in Uige, Angola, in
2005, as far as activities in the community are concerned; les-
sons learned in the hospital are reported elsewhere in this sup-
plement [6]. Initially, the intervention, focusing on biosafety
measures and epidemiological efﬁcacy, caused community re-
sistance; subsequently, the MSF team reevaluated its approach
and made substantial changes to its intervention.
BACKGROUND
In February2005,UigeProvincialHospitalphysiciansperceived
an increase in the number of children presenting with fever
and bloody diarrhea. During the same period, several hospital
workers reported illness with hemorrhagic fever–like symp-
toms. On 9 March 2005, the Angolan Ministry of Health
(MINSA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) sent 4
patient blood samples to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and to the Pasteur In-
stitute in Dakar, Senegal. Five days later, 8 more samples were
sent to the CDC, which, on 23 March, conﬁrmedbypolymerase
chain reaction analysis that 9 of the 12 clinical specimens were
positive for MHF [7].
On 27 March, MSF, together with MINSA, the WHO, and
others, started prevention, control, and treatment procedures
in accordance with established protocols in response to the
outbreak in Uige, the largest recorded MHF outbreak to date,
with 374 putative cases (158 laboratory conﬁrmed) and 329
deaths (case fatality rate, 88%) [8]. The last patient with lab-
oratory-conﬁrmed MHF died on 21 July. The WHO and
MINSA declared the outbreak to be ofﬁcially over on 7 No-
vember 2005 [9]. The majority of the 374 cases reported from
the province of Uige came from the city of Uige, a municipality
of ∼180,000 inhabitants.
The initial outbreak response. When the initial MSF team
arrived, the single-room provisional Marburg ward of Uige
Provincial Hospital contained 5 patients suspected to have
MHF, together with 2 corpses of patients suspected to have
died of MHF. In addition, 11 decomposing corpses of patients
located in the hospital mortuary were suspected by hospital
personnel to have died of MHF. During this initial phase, di-
agnostic conﬁrmation was obtained for patients but not for
corpses, because of their decomposed state.
The ﬁrst priority of the team was to set up a Marburg ward
within the hospital that followed safety precautions to prevent
exposure of hospital workers and others to the ﬁlovirus. After
FHF outbreak control procedures, the provisional ward and 3
adjacent buildings were encircled with 2-m-high opaque plastic
fencing and, together with the mortuary at the back of the
hospital compound, were thoroughly decontaminatedbywash-
ing down ﬂoors, walls, doors, and interior furnishings with a
0.5% chlorine solution [6].
At a cemetery, the team proceeded to inter corpses,following
an MSF protocol [10]. These burials at the start of the inter-
vention upset the community considerably. MSF attempted to
contact the relatives of the deceased through hospital author-
ities and community health workers before starting safe burial
procedures. Possibly because of fear, the relatives of some of
the deceased declined to accept MSF’s invitation to identify
their loved ones and witness the burial. Left with a number of
unidentiﬁed decomposing and possibly highly infectious
corpses, MSF decided to proceed with the burials. The team
marked the graves to help locate them and to facilitate the
relatives’ mourning process. Nevertheless, even when fear and
anger in the community at large had subsided months later,
some relatives were still distressed, not knowing where their
loved ones had been buried.
Concurrently, the team received reportsfromthecommunity
about deaths and patients suspected to have MHF. Wearing
personal protective equipment(PPE;ﬁgure1),MSFteammem-
bers expanded the outbreak response from the hospital to the
community. Already frightened by the outbreak, the commu-
nity was alarmed by the team’s appearance,particularlybecause
the hood and goggles made it difﬁcult to see the faces of team
members. The spraying of households with disinfectant also
disquieted the community. In Uige, as in many communities
in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a ubiquitous suspicion of de-
liberate poisoning. It is understandable that the spraying of a
milky, poisonous-smelling liquid in one’s household by indi-
viduals whose features could not be discerned caused indig-
nation—particularly when, a few days later, inhabitants of this
household became ill with MHF. Although many requested to
have their household sprayed, some found these activities du-
bious and were suspicious of MSF. As the outbreak progressed,
fear and anger intensiﬁed, culminating in verbal aggression
toward the team and stones being thrown at MSF vehicles.
Individuals suspected to have MHF no longer presented them-
selves for assessment and possible isolation. This resistance led
to a temporary suspension of community-based activitieswhile
MSF reviewed its strategy. (Seeﬁgure2foratimelineofselected
events during the MHF epidemic.)
LESSONS LEARNED
Burial and disinfection. Initially, burials and disinfection
were conducted in accordance with an MSF protocol used in
previous FHF outbreaks [10]. In parallel, the WHO used aS164 • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • Roddy et al.
Figure 1. To be avoided: burial team driving to a household already fully dressed in personal protective equipment. The better practice is to dress
in front of household members.
somewhat different protocol for the same activities [11]. Al-
though the MSF protocol was technically sound, it failed to
emphasize the importance of incorporating local traditionsand
addressing the psychological and spiritual needs of families in
the burial and disinfection process. Furthermore, MSF did not
always explain activities to bystanders and the community at
large before performing procedures. The protocol employed by
the WHO, although more time consuming in its execution,
contained the culturally sensitive aspects missing from the MSF
protocol.
During the review of its activities, MSF adopted a modiﬁed
version of the WHO protocol. The burial and disinfectionteam
would now dress in PPE and undress in the presence of house-
hold members. This allowed the family to realize that human
beings like themselves were performing burial and disinfection
procedures. The team entered the house, accompanied by a
single family member dressed in PPE who was allowed to wit-
ness the procedures. One member of the MSF team, preferably
a psychosocial worker, remained outside of the house incivilian
clothing and assumed the role of a “cultural interpreter,” pro-
viding a full and detailed explanation of the procedures to the
family and bystanders.
Burial practices were modiﬁed, incorporating adapted and
safe traditional burial rites and the use of cofﬁns. The modi-
ﬁcations involved 3 key elements. The ﬁrst allowed the family
to identify the corpse before burial. Beyond conﬁrming death,
this allayed fears and rumors of grotesque incidents happening
to their loved ones. Previously, the relatives were not able to
observe the placement of the corpse into a body bag and/or
cofﬁn because the procedure took place inside the Marburg
ward or the household without a witnessing family member.
The second element ensured that family members knew the
location of the grave so that they would have a place to mourn
their dead. In Uige, Christianity is the predominant religion,
which places importance on visiting the resting place of the
deceased. The third element allowed burial rites during the
outbreak to reﬂect, as much as possible, the traditional rites.
This included innocuous practices such as song and dance,
carrying and lowering the cofﬁn into the grave while using
gloves, and ﬁlling the grave with earth. In some families,bodies
are traditionally washed and hugged before interment. The
modiﬁed practice, performed only on request, involved the
burial team washing the corpse and placingpersonalbelongings
inside the cofﬁn in the presence of a family member. Burial
rites were conducted at the cemetery or household, depending
on the preference of the family. No family members were al-
lowed to touch the corpse.
Disinfection through spraying with chlorine solution some-
times damaged household items such as mattresses and cloth-
ing. Items that possibly were highly contaminated—for ex-
ample, the soiled mattress and clothing of the deceased—were
destroyed by burning. MSF learned that replacing damagedandMSF Intervention: Community • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S165
Figure 2. Time line of selected events during the Marburghemorrhagic
fever epidemic, Uige, Angola, 2005. CDC, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention; HBRR, home-based risk reduction; IEC, information, ed-
ucation, and communication; MINSA, Angolan Ministry of Health; MSF,
Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res; WHO, World Health Organization.
destroyed items mitigated the family’s loss and facilitated ac-
ceptance of the procedure.
Home-based risk reduction. The concept of home-based
risk reduction (HBRR) was implemented in response to com-
munity resistance to care and isolation in the hospital and
MSF’s concern to overcome a deadlock in communityrelations
in this respect. When a patient adamantly refused hospitali-
zation, the patient was advised to stay in 1 room of his house-
hold not shared with anybody else. With the exception of 1
designated caregiver, no other individual was allowed into the
room. This caregiver was equipped with PPE, including gown,
apron, mask, gloves, and goggles, and received instructions re-
garding how to dress, undress, and maintain the equipment.
MSF, represented by a doctor and/or nurse, a water sanitation
specialist, and a psychologist, conducted daily visits to the
HBRR patients to monitor the health of the patient, encourage
adherence to the HBRR protocol, and replenish medicalstocks.
During home visits, MSF staff engaged the family members in
discussion about the progress of the patient, the causes and
modes of transmission of the disease, the MSF intervention at
large, and advantages of care in the Marburg ward; thus, the
patient and family were continuously encouraged to accept
hospitalization.
The HBRR program was implemented near the end of the
outbreak, and only 4 patients were enrolled, 3 of them with
conﬁrmed MHF, 1 with suspected MHF (test result not avail-
able). Three patients eventually accepted care in the Marburg
ward, and, remarkably, all 4 survived.
As in earlier outbreaks [4, 5, 12], HBRR was meant to be a
provisional solution when isolation and care in the Marburg
ward could not be implemented, and it became an emergent
component of FHF outbreak control. HBRR programs cannot
replace health-structure–based patient management in termsof
quality medical care or biosafety. Instead, it reduces the risk of
disease transmission when care and isolation in an FHF ward
is refuted while the patient and family continue to be encour-
aged to accept hospitalization. Should HBRR be part of out-
break control in the future, provision of sufﬁcient training,
supervision, and resources is crucial. If circumstances allow,
the safety and effectiveness of HBBR should be evaluated.
Epidemiologicalsurveillance. Epidemiologicalsurveillance
in the community was organized by MINSA and WHO. Under
their guidance, MSF contributed to the investigation of alerts
and contact tracing. These activities aimed at identifying in-
cident cases of MHF and allowed for prompt isolation to stop
secondary transmission. Contacts of patients with MHF were
followed up for 21 days, which is generally considered to be
the maximum incubation period.
Investigation of alerts and contact tracing are labor-intensive
activities. At times, insufﬁcient supervision resulted in individ-
uals suspected to have MHF not being properly investigated or
referred when appropriate. Also, early in the outbreak, those
who were sick were reluctant to accept hospitalization in the
Marburg ward because there was a perceived lack of treatment
efforts and no clear survival advantage, as demonstrated by the
high case fatality rate in the facility [6]. In part, these challenges
were overcome by involving the Sobas, traditional and ofﬁcial
community leaders trusted by the people, in the interaction
with families. A more proactive treatment approach also con-
tributed to improving acceptability of hospitalization [6].
The monitoring of cemeteries was another component of
MSF’s epidemiological surveillance, producing daily counts of
fresh graves at all ofﬁcial burial sites. Attempts to clarify cause
of death were often in vain. Such all-cause mortality surveil-
lance aims at early detection of excess mortality due to either
MHF itself or other causes of death as a consequenceofreduced
health service utilization. MSF did not detect an apparent in-
crease in global mortality rates in the community during the
MHF epidemic. The usefulness of monitoring burial sites re-S166 • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • Roddy et al.
mains unclear, particularly in the absence of reliable pre-epi-
demic mortality ﬁgures. In Uige, it did not lead to any mod-
iﬁcations of the outbreak response.
Peripheral health facilities. To facilitate controllingtheep-
idemic, MINSA, under government authority, closed private
health facilities and prohibited the use of injections, vaccina-
tions, and blood sampling in public health facilities. MINSA
and MSF provided the latter with PPE material, including
hoods, masks, and gloves. In the urban sectors most affected
by the epidemic, MSF disinfected public health facilities using
a 0.5% chlorine solution and trained staff to identify suspected
MHF cases, to use protective barriers when providing nursing
care, and to report potential cases to the authorities.
Although the support of peripheral facilities did not lead to
the identiﬁcation of new MHF cases, it may have protected
staff and patients from nosocomial transmission. The Uige ex-
perience suggests that the continuation of properly supported
health care services during an FHF outbreak is possible.
Psychosocial support. Psychosocial support started as an
activity for stress and fear management for MSF expatriate and
local staff. When it became clear that, devoid of psychosocial
support, patients and their relatives had acute unmet needs,
support was quickly extended to them. MSF psychologists and
local staff worked together in teams to provide support during
key interchanges with patients, families, and the community.
Psychosocial support provided to hospitalized patients and
their relatives is described elsewhere in this supplement [6].
The psychosocial teams served as mediators between the pa-
tients, families, and community and the burial and disinfection
and HBRR teams. Through discussions, they ensured that rel-
atives of deceased individuals participated in burial and dis-
infection activities while adhering to biosafety norms. In sup-
port of the HBRR program, they spoke directly with patients
and caregivers to explain procedures, discuss concerns, and
ensure agreement to program participation. Concurrent with
burial and disinfection and HBRR activities, the psychosocial
teams sensitized other family members, neighbors, and by-
standers about the causes and modes of transmission of the
disease and the MSF intervention.
Given their adverse relationship with an, at times, hostile
community and their proximity to the virus, expatriate and
local members of burial and disinfection teams and themedical
and cleaning teams of the Marburg ward were targeted with
stress and fear management sessions. Psychosocial support in-
cluded training workshops and group and individual sessions
on stress and fear management. Participants were encouraged
to share thoughts, feelings, and experiences through painting,
writing, role playing, and dialogue. Each participant’s reported
coping mechanisms were analyzed, and suggestions for im-
provement were made. The causes and modes of transmission
of the disease and the intervention strategy were discussed.
When appropriate, the psychosocial team also held separate
sessions for family members of local staff to address their fears
and anxieties. During the outbreak intervention, no expatriate
or local MSF personnel were infected with the Marburg virus.
Similar to what was seen in the 2003 Ebola hemorrhagic fever
outbreak in the Republic of the Congo, health personnel and the
community alike reported that the psychosocial interventions
provided during this MHF outbreak allayed fear and anger
among family members, reduced patient stigmatization, and
quelled rumors and panic in the community [12]. The use of
local staff in the psychosocial support program was instrumental
in facilitating the community’s understanding of the disease and
acceptance of the intervention. Postoutbreak surveys that eval-
uate the community response to psychosocial interventions
would provide direction for future support programs.
Information and education campaigns. The initial message
about MHF relayed to the community included the statement
that “There is no cure for this disease.” This was understood by
community members to mean “Even if I accept hospitalization,
death is certain.” Acceptance of isolation, thus, had to rely on
the entirelyaltruisticmotiveofprotectingone’sfamilyandneigh-
bors from infection. Not surprisingly, some indigenous com-
munity-based healers promised a cure and distracted the com-
munity from following advice from the outbreak response team.
Later, in an attempt to correct this “alarmist” message, the in-
formation, education, and communication (IEC) program,
through mass media messages and discussions with community
groups and individual families, emphasized that infected indi-
viduals should come to the hospital and receive treatment.How-
ever, the message was somewhat overcorrected and now made
the optimistic claim that “patients will survive due to hospital
treatment,” as opposed to “patients have a better chance of sur-
viving if treated at the hospital,” with a risk of nurturing un-
realistic hopes. This illustrates that disseminating accurate and
realistic message sometimes means walking a ﬁne line. MSF did
not intervene in IEC activities on a large scale but was able to
deliver simple messages about MHF and the MSF intervention,
although to limited audiences, during outreach activities such as
burials, disinfections, and HBRR.
By reinforcing fear and despair, IEC activities at the start of
the MHF intervention contributed to nonacceptance of the
Marburg ward and security problems in the community. In
future outbreaks, IEC should emphasize that treatment—albeit
limited in its effectiveness—and care from medical profession-
als is available at the FHF ward. An effective IEC program is
crucial to the control of the outbreak and should be imple-
mented from the start of the intervention.
DISCUSSION
MSF has contributed to the responses to every FHF outbreak
since 1995 and thereby has gained considerable outbreak re-
sponse experience. Nevertheless, previous lessons learned re-MSF Intervention: Community • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S167
garding how to make FHF outbreak responses more acceptable
to the community were not easily accessible to the initial team
in Uige. In large part, this was because of a lack of consolidated
documentation of these experiences. In principle, MSF updates
its protocols and guidelines on a regular basis, but lessons
learned have not always been critically evaluated and have usu-
ally not been published for the beneﬁt of a larger readership.
The team in Uige, similar to previous teams in FHF outbreaks,
initially made errors, corrected them, and underwent an im-
portant learning process that improved the effectiveness of the
intervention. Sharing these experiences with other FHF out-
break response actors will strengthen future FHF interventions.
The experience in Uige clearly demonstrates that biosafety
and epidemiological efﬁcacy alone are not sufﬁcient to make
an FHF intervention effective. MSF’s initially strained relations
with the community improved promptly and signiﬁcantly after
modifying burial and disinfection protocols; this improvement
is thought to have been due to increased transparency and
respect for the psychosocial needs of the family. The Uige ex-
perience conﬁrms what had been learned during earlier out-
breaks: the adaptation of safe burial practices to accommodate
the need for ritual and mourning is crucially important for
fostering the community’s trust and willingness to cooperate
with the outbreak response team [2, 4, 12].
Involving local authorities and respected inﬂuential individ-
uals is an established principle of public health interventions
in the community. However, this principle is easily forgotten
in the heat of an FHF outbreak. When MSF involved such
authorities, community relations improved promptly and sig-
niﬁcantly, ameliorating case ﬁnding and outbreak control.
CONCLUSION
When the international organizations in charge of outbreak
control arrived in Uige, the epidemic was at its height. A large
number of patients with MHF and deaths due to MHF had to
be ascertained by community surveillance. Control measures
and the setting up of health facilities for patients with MHF
required immediate attention and pushed IEC andpsychosocial
programs aside. In retrospect, we understand that an interven-
tion that neglects the timely delivery of accurate and realistic
IEC messages and ignores the psychosocial needs of patients,
families, and the community will intensify anxieties and pro-
voke resistance. Because regaining lost trust is more arduous
and prone to failure than establishing it in the ﬁrst place, we
believe that IEC and respect for psychosocial needs must be
part of an FHF intervention from the beginning. Actively in-
volving all key stakeholders from the beginning is crucial.
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